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SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF AMERICANS
ABROAD: RE-EXAMINING THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT’S WARRANT CLAUSE AND THE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE EXCEPTION FIVE
YEARS AFTER UNITED STATES V. BIN LADEN
COREY M. THEN
The proposition is, of course, not that the Constitution ‘does not
apply’ overseas, but that there are provisions in the Constitution
which do not necessarily apply in all circumstances in every foreign
place.
—Justice John Harlan

1

INTRODUCTION
The United States intelligence community subjects certain
American citizens living abroad to secret wiretaps of their phones and
physical searches of their homes, without obtaining a judicial warrant.
Take for instance a Texan, living with his wife and young children in
Kenya, whose every telephone conversation was monitored for a year
and whose home was entered while he was away in order to
confiscate his property. Should Americans care that their government
might so intrude on their privacy without a warrant? Should those
sentiments change when the Texan is an al-Qaeda operative who
participated in the terrorist attacks on United States Embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania, and who was later convicted of conspiracy to
commit murder and destroy U.S. property?
Certainly, Americans should be concerned about their
government’s surveillance powers, especially during a war on terror
that differs from any other conflict in our nation’s history. Yet since a
federal district judge decided five years ago in United States v. Bin

Copyright © 2006 by Corey M. Then.
1. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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2
Laden that a judicial warrant is not required to search Americans
abroad when the information sought is primarily for foreign
intelligence rather than criminal investigative purposes,3 the judiciary
has been silent on this point. Because the constitutionality of these
warrantless searches is by no means settled, the recent five-year
anniversary of Bin Laden makes this a fitting time to re-examine the
judicial approach to searches of Americans living abroad during the
war on terror and to determine whether a different standard is
needed.
This Note argues that warrants to conduct electronic surveillance
and physical searches of Americans abroad are neither
constitutionally required nor an effective safeguard of liberty.
Whereas the majority of the scant commentary on Bin Laden has
criticized it for asserting a foreign intelligence exception4 to the
5
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, this Note attempts to shift
the framework within which the Bin Laden court worked. Although
Bin Laden’s acceptance of the foreign intelligence exception correctly
prevented the court from having to exclude valuable evidence that
helped convict an international terrorist, future courts should not be
confined by the warrant requirement and the exclusionary rule.
Instead, this Note proposes that the Constitution does not
require a warrant for searches and seizures of Americans abroad,
whether the searches are for foreign intelligence gathering or normal
criminal investigations. This proposition may at first seem an
anathema, but Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is riddled with

2. 126 F. Supp. 2d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
3. Id. at 275.
4. Foreign intelligence information is defined as information relating to, or if concerning a
United States person, necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect against attacks by
a foreign power, sabotage or international terrorism, or intelligence activities of a foreign
power, or, information that is related or necessary to the national defense, security, or foreign
affairs of the United States. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2000). Foreign intelligence gathering is frequently
contrasted with normal criminal investigations throughout this Note.
5. See Justin M. Sandberg, Comment, The Need for Warrants Authorizing Foreign
Intelligence Searches of American Citizens Abroad: A Call for Formalism, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
403, 406 (2002) (supporting a categorical requirement to obtain a warrant regardless of whether
the primary purpose of the search is foreign intelligence); Carrie Truehart, Case Comment,
United States v. Bin Laden and the Foreign Intelligence Exception to the Warrant Requirement
for Searches of “United States Persons” Abroad, B.U. L. REV. 555, 599 (2002) (proposing FISC
procedures for unilateral U.S. searches of its citizens abroad). But see Constance Pfeiffer, Note,
Feeling Insecure?: United States v. Bin Laden and the Merits of a Foreign-Intelligence Exception
for Searches Abroad, 23 REV. LITIG. 209, 237 (2004) (concluding, with some reservations, that
Bin Laden was correctly decided).
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exceptions to the warrant requirement that prove it is not absolute.
Although a warrant is constitutionally required in many domestic
searches, that does not lead indubitably to the conclusion that a
warrant is required for searches outside of the United States. The
many exceptions in modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
suggest that courts have been heavily influenced by policy
considerations in making their constitutional pronouncements
regarding warrants.7 Yet there is little in the text or history of the
amendment that mandates a preference for warrants, and in the case
of searches abroad, practical and policy considerations weigh against
recognizing a warrant requirement. One of the central policy
considerations behind recognizing a warrant requirement is to protect
the privacy of American citizens against unreasonable searches, but
this Note contends that, for searches occurring overseas, courts could
ensure greater privacy protection by developing a more rigorous legal
reasonableness standard8 that opens the federal government up to
greater civil liability.
In setting out this argument, Part I provides a brief history of the
Fourth Amendment. Part II presents a detailed description of Bin
Laden and the foreign intelligence exception. Part III challenges the
6. This proposition is further supported by the fact that certain well-regarded
commentators continue to challenge the assumption that the Fourth Amendment ever requires a
warrant. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 768
(1994) (asserting that reasonableness, and not warrants or probable cause, is the fundamental
value underlying the Fourth Amendment); see also William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth
Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 885 (1991) (“The reasons for requiring warrants are
genuine, but not strong; it is entirely plausible that the system would function better without
them.”). Professor Stuntz ultimately concludes that requiring warrants may have some desirable
effects, but hedges when he says that “[o]n the merits, it is hard to say with any certainty which
choice is right.” Id. at 942.
7. Even supporters of the rule like Professor Donald Dripps admit that the “exclusionary
rule cases are arbitrary.” Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional
Law: “Here I Go Down That Wrong Road Again,” 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1603–08 (1996).
Professor Dripps posits that Mapp v. Ohio, 368 U.S. 871 (1961), which extended the
exclusionary rule beyond federal to state and local governmental bodies, forced the Supreme
Court to use policy-driven, “reasonable suspicion” tests in evaluating the constitutionality of
stop-and-frisks, building inspections, and other “coercive street encounters.” These types of
searches were ordinarily the province of local police, and a harsh, inflexible application of the
exclusionary rule would have made it extremely difficult for police to effectively perform their
duties. Id.
8. Like probable cause, reasonableness “can be defined legally, in which case there will
develop, over time, a detailed set of common-law rules for various kinds of recurring fact
patterns. Or it can be defined factually, with the standard meaning whatever individual
magistrates and judges say it means in particular cases.” Stuntz, supra note 6, at 927. This Note
argues for the expansion of a legal reasonableness doctrine.
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application of the warrant requirement to overseas searches. Finally,
Part IV proposes that a more stringent reasonableness inquiry would
better comport with constitutional requirements and balance liberty
and security interests.
I. RELEVANT FOURTH AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
Over the last half century, the Supreme Court has interpreted
the Fourth Amendment to require a warrant and probable cause for
all searches and seizures, as well as the exclusion from trial of illegally
obtained evidence.9 Nonetheless, myriad exceptions and
qualifications puncture the general rule,10 and the amendment’s text
does not actually require warrants:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
11
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Individually, the Justices have attacked the Court’s modern
jurisprudence for abandoning the amendment’s historical and textual
12
antecedents. One influential commentator has implored that “[w]e
need to read the Amendment’s words and take them seriously: they

9. Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 257, 260 (1984).
10. See infra notes 69–80 and accompanying text.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
12. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The
Fourth Amendment does not by its terms require a prior warrant for searches and seizures; it
merely prohibits searches and seizures that are ‘unreasonable.’”); Nat’l Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665–66 (1989) (Kennedy, J.) (“[W]here a Fourth Amendment
intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is
necessary to balance the individual’s privacy expectations against the Government’s interests to
determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized
suspicion in the particular context.”); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 437–38 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]he so-called ‘exclusionary rule’ created by this Court imposes a
burden out of all proportion to the Fourth Amendment values which it seeks to advance by
seriously impeding the efforts of the national, state, and local governments to apprehend and
convict those who have violated their laws.”); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973)
(Rehnquist, J.) (“Although vehicles are ‘effects’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional difference between houses
and cars.” (internal quotations omitted)).
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do not require warrants, probable cause or exclusion of evidence, but
13
they do require that all searches and seizures be reasonable.”
The Supreme Court has never considered the applicability of the
Fourth Amendment to Americans abroad, but the amendment likely
14
applies in at least some form. In Reid v. Covert, an Air Force
sergeant’s wife was convicted in a military tribunal for the murder of
15
her husband while stationed in England. The Supreme Court
granted the defendant’s application for a writ of habeas corpus,
proclaiming that the Constitution guaranteed her a jury trial because
“the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the
Constitution provide to protect [one’s] life and liberty should not be
16
stripped away just because [one] happens to be in another land.”
Nonetheless, only a plurality joined Justice Black’s opinion. Justice
Harlan’s controlling concurrence extended Fifth and Sixth
Amendment protections to the defendant, but rejected the plurality’s
sweeping language claiming that the Bill of Rights operates
unconditionally abroad: “I cannot agree with the suggestion that
every provision of the Constitution must always be deemed
automatically applicable to American citizens in every part of the
world.”17
More recently, in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,18 Chief
Justice Rehnquist concluded for a divided Court that a Mexican
criminal suspect could not invoke the Fourth Amendment to
challenge a search and seizure, because the amendment’s drafters did
not contemplate nonresident aliens within “the people” that it would
protect.19 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence explicitly rejected Justice
Rehnquist’s categorical exclusion for a more flexible approach,
echoing Justice Harlan’s statement in Reid that “the question of
which specific safeguards . . . are appropriately to be applied in a
particular context . . . can be reduced to the issue of what process is
‘due’ a defendant in the particular circumstances of a particular
case.”20 Still, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy, and
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
278.

Amar, supra note 6, at 759.
354 U.S. 1.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring).
494 U.S. 259 (1990).
Id. at 265 (1990).
Reid, 354 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring), cited in Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at
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Stevens are in most instances careful to qualify their limitations on
21
the Fourth Amendment to nonresident aliens. These careful
delineations make it likely that the Court views citizens living abroad,
in contrast to nonresident aliens, as part of “the people.” Thus, the
Supreme Court would likely hold that at least some elements of the
Fourth Amendment apply to Americans abroad, even though it has
22
not yet confronted the question directly.
II. UNITED STATES V. BIN LADEN
AND THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE EXCEPTION
Bin Laden remains the only case that has directly addressed the
question of whether the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to
conduct foreign intelligence surveillance on Americans overseas. It is
instructive to consider the methodology underlying Bin Laden
because many of the arguments that support a foreign intelligence
exception to the warrant requirement also support the broader
argument in Parts III and IV that this requirement should not be
automatically applied overseas. Following a brief recitation of Bin
Laden’s facts and holding, Section A reviews the constitutional and
practical bases relied upon by Judge Leonard B. Sand in this case.
Section B examines Judge Sand’s application of the foreign
intelligence exception to the surveillance of El-Hage. Section C
explores Judge Sand’s refusal to exclude evidence. Finally, Section D

21. Despite the general care to confine the holding only to nonresident aliens, Justice
Rehnquist does note that “the drafting of the Fourth Amendment also suggests that its purpose
was to restrict searches and seizures which might be conducted by the United States in domestic
matters.” Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 266 (emphasis added). Whether this foreshadows
restricting the Fourth Amendment to domestic situations even when an American citizen is
involved remains to be seen.
22. See id. (“[T]he purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to protect the people of the
United States against arbitrary action by their own Government; it was never suggested that the
provision was intended to restrain the actions of the Federal Government against aliens outside
of the United States territory.”); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 249
(1960) (“[A civilian dependent stationed abroad] is protected by the specific provisions of
Article III [of the Constitution] and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments . . . .”); Reid, 354 U.S. at
40–41 (“[U]nder our Constitution courts of law alone are given power to try civilians for their
offenses against the United States.”); Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(“[W]e think it clear . . . that the Fourth Amendment is violated by a general search [of one’s
home].”); Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 782 (5th Cir. 1965) (“[T]he Fourth
Amendment does not apply to arrests and searches made by [foreign] officials in [a foreign
country] for violation of [foreign] law, even if the persons arrested are Americans and American
police officers gave information leading to the arrest and search.”).
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discusses the cursory review given to the reasonableness of the search
in Bin Laden.
The defendant on trial in Bin Laden, Lebanese-born Wadih ElHage, had emigrated to the United States, become a citizen, attended
college at the University of Southwestern Louisiana, and lived in
23
Arlington, Texas with his American wife and children. His ties to
Usama Bin Laden eventually caused him to move to Kenya, where
the United States intelligence community secretly monitored five
telephone lines linked to Al-Qaeda from August 1996 through 1997,
some of which El-Hage used.24 The attorney general did not authorize
intelligence gathering aimed specifically at El-Hage himself until
25
April of 1997. On August 21, 1997, American and Kenyan
intelligence officials, including one FBI agent,26 jointly searched ElHage’s residence and seized a computer with contents linking him to
the 1998 bombings of the United States Embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania.27 Kenyan authorities presented El-Hage’s wife with a
Kenyan warrant, but no U.S. warrant was ever obtained, and the
United States explicitly disavowed relying on the Kenyan warrant for
authority.28
El-Hage moved to suppress the evidence gained from electronic
surveillance and the search of his home on the grounds that it was
obtained without a warrant and, alternatively, that the searches were
29
unreasonable. Judge Leonard B. Sand ultimately held that: (1) the
Fourth Amendment and its warrant requirement applies to
Americans abroad;30 (2) an exception to the warrant requirement
31
exists for foreign intelligence searches; (3) any evidence obtained
prior to the attorney general’s authorization to specifically target El-

23. Oriana Zill, A Portrait of Wadih El Hage, Accused Terrorist, FRONTLINE, Sept. 12,
2001, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/upclose/elhage.html.
24. United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
25. Id.
26. This is notable because the common perception of the FBI is that it is a domestic law
enforcement and intelligence agency, while the CIA focuses on foreign intelligence. In actual
practice, this dichotomy does not always hold true. See RICHARD A. POSNER, PREVENTING
SURPRISE ATTACKS 31 (2005) (“[B]efore 9/11 the CIA and the FBI exaggerated the degree to
which they were forbidden to share information . . . .”).
27. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 268–69.
28. Id. at 269.
29. Id. at 270.
30. Id. at 270–71.
31. Id. at 275.
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32
Hage did not fit under this exception and was therefore unlawful; (4)
the exclusionary rule did not, however, apply to this unlawfully
obtained evidence;33 and (5) both the electronic surveillance and the
34
physical search of El-Hage’s home were reasonable. Thus, El-Hage’s
35
motion to suppress evidence was denied.

A. The Constitutional and Practical Bases for a Foreign
Intelligence Exception
Judge Sand relied on the broadest language in the Reid and
Verdugo-Urquidez opinions to permit El-Hage to assert a Fourth
Amendment challenge, implicitly assuming that a warrant
requirement exists overseas, but he ultimately determined that the
warrant requirement was inapplicable under the Bin Laden facts.36
Prior to the enactment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
37
Act (FISA) in 1978, four circuits had held that a U.S. citizen could
be searched without a warrant, provided that there was probable
cause to suspect that person was an agent of a foreign power and that
the investigation was not for normal criminal purposes.38 However,
these holdings only addressed Americans within the United States,
and the Second Circuit had not confronted the question of whether
Americans could be searched without a warrant for foreign
intelligence purposes. Therefore, Judge Sand articulated the
exception by blending constitutional and practical justifications within
three main categories: the president’s constitutional power over
foreign affairs, the policy costs of imposing a warrant requirement,
and the absence of a warrant procedure.
Judge Sand’s conclusion that the president has broad
constitutional powers over foreign affairs and intelligence collection is
39
well supported by precedent, as is the fact that prior to FISA

32. Id. at 280–81
33. Id. at 281.
34. Id. at 284–86.
35. Id. at 288.
36. Id. at 270, 279.
37. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1863 (2000).
38. See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d
Cir. 1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973).
39. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (discussing
the “very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations”); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106
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“[w]arrantless foreign intelligence collection ha[d] been an
40
established practice of the Executive Branch for decades.” FISA
changed this practice for Americans within the United States,
requiring intelligence officials to obtain authorization from both the
attorney general as well as a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISC) before investigating.41 Judge Sand viewed the fact that FISA
did not address intelligence collection on Americans abroad, as well
as the Supreme Court’s silence on the issue, as favoring wide
executive latitude.42
Judge Sand then switched to practical considerations, recognizing
that any warrant requirement has frequently been disregarded when
it “proves to be a disproportionate and perhaps even disabling burden
on the Executive.”43 He asserted that requiring judicial approval in
advance would decrease the speed of executive response to foreign
intelligence threats, as well as increase the likelihood of security
breaches, because the executive would have to take the judiciary into
its confidence.44 Judge Sand accepted the government’s arguments
that at a preliminary stage, courts would have great difficulty in
measuring the impact of their decisions on U.S. foreign policy and
cooperative relations with other governments. He also noted that

(1875) (recognizing the president’s power to conduct intelligence operations and to employ
secret agents).
40. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (quoting William F. Brown & Americo R.
Cinquegrana, Warrantless Physical Searches for Foreign Intelligence Purposes: Executive Order
12,333 and the Fourth Amendment, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 97, 103 (1985) (“‘Warrantless electronic
surveillance has been used by the Executive to collect intelligence information since at least the
mid-1800s . . . . Warrantless physical searches have been used for a much longer period of
time.’”)).
41. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(b) (2000).
42. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (“[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have
also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the
structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘Executive Power’ vested in the
President by § 1 of Art. II.”)); see also United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297,
321–22 (1972) (holding that there is no warrant exception for domestic security surveillances but
“express[ing] no opinion as to, the issues which may be involved with respect to activities of
foreign powers or their agents”).
43. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 273–74. Judge Sand also cited searches by probation
officers, as in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876 (1987), and searches related to the
regulation of railroad employees, as in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association, 489
U.S. 602, 619 (1989), as exceptions to the search warrant requirement outside of the foreign
affairs context. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 274.
44. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 275.
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requiring notification to certain governments that might be hostile to
45
the United States could be ruinous. Judge Sand used FISA’s
legislative history as evidence that Congress recognized these
difficulties and consequently limited FISA’s reach to searches within
U.S. borders.46 For instance, then-Attorney General Griffin Bell
noted that because “there is a fair degree of cooperation between our
Government and the police and intelligence services of other
nations . . . . limitations on [overseas] surveillances could result in the
loss of cooperation.”47
Similarly, Judge Sand cited the absence of any statutory basis to
issue a warrant abroad as a reason supporting the foreign intelligence
exception. He relied on Verdugo-Urquidez’s statement that a warrant
from an American magistrate “‘would be a dead letter outside the
United States’” to refute El-Hage’s argument that the U.S. must
abide by its own constitutional limitations in order to exercise
jurisdiction extra-territorially.48 While Judge Sand did not accept the
proposition that obtaining a warrant for a foreign search would be
impossible, he stated that it would “certainly have been
impracticable” given the absence of a statutory basis, the unsuitability
of traditional procedures to foreign intelligence collection, and the
risk that sensitive information could be publicly revealed.49
B. Adopting and Applying the Foreign Intelligence Exception
After declaring the legality of a foreign intelligence exception,
Judge Sand closely mirrored the procedures outlined in FISA for
surveillance of Americans within U.S. borders to determine whether
the exception would apply to El-Hage’s situation. In doing so, he
required that there be probable cause to suspect that the defendant is
an agent of a foreign power; that the searches or seizures be
primarily50 for foreign intelligence purposes; and that the searches

45. Id. at 274.
46. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 7 n.2 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3790,
3796, and H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, at 27–28 (1978)).
47. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978: Hearing on S. 1566 Before the Subcomm.
on Intelligence and the Rights of Americans of the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong.
12–13 (1978).
48. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 276 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U.S. 259, 278 (1990)).
49. Id. at 277.
50. This requirement is more closely analogous to FISA’s standard prior to passage of the
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
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51
first be authorized by the president or attorney general. He
determined that the surveillance and physical search of El-Hage’s
home satisfied each of these requirements, except for the electronic
surveillance that was conducted prior to April 1997, when the
attorney general first authorized intelligence collection aimed
specifically at El-Hage.52 After a lengthy analysis, Judge Sand ruled
that the electronic surveillance of El-Hage prior to April, 1997 was
not merely incidental to the efforts directed at Al-Qaeda, and that ElHage had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home that could
53
only be abrogated by attorney general authorization. The
surveillance conducted prior to April 1997 was therefore unlawful
and necessitated consideration under the exclusionary rule.54

C. Refusing to Employ the Exclusionary Rule
Judge Sand announced that the main purpose of the exclusionary
rule, which holds that evidence obtained in contravention of the
Fourth Amendment may not be used against a defendant at trial, is to
55
deter overzealous searches by government agents. He pointed to the
exclusionary rule’s prudential rather than constitutional nature, and
decided that excluding the evidence at issue would serve no deterrent
purpose because the intelligence officials were motivated to catch Bin
Laden, and “surveillance would have been conducted even if there
had been an awareness that the material recorded would be
inadmissible at a future criminal trial of El-Hage.”56 Judge Sand also
noted that “‘the Court, in recent years, has refused to apply the rule
to situations where it would achieve little or no deterrence.’”57

Obstruct Terrorism (Patriot) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). FISA
previously required that to apply to FISC for an order to conduct foreign intelligence
surveillance on Americans within the United States, the attorney general first had to find that
the “purpose of the search is to obtain foreign intelligence information.” 50 U.S.C. §§
1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B) (2000). The Patriot Act changed that language to “a significant
purpose,” thereby enabling FISC to issue an order for some searches that would be expected to
garner normal criminal investigative information, as well as foreign intelligence. Id. (after 2001
change) (emphasis added).
51. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 277.
52. Id. at 279.
53. Id. at 279–82.
54. Id. at 282.
55. Id. at 283.
56. Id.
57. Id. (quoting United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir. 1980)).

06__THEN.DOC

1070

10/4/2006 1:10 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:1059

In addition, Judge Sand applied the exclusionary rule’s “good
faith exception,” which originally applied in the case of an invalid
58
warrant, to El-Hage’s situation. Because intelligence officials
“operated under an actual and reasonable belief that Attorney
General approval was not required prior to April 4, 1997,” Judge
Sand offered good faith as an independent rationale against
59
exclusion.
D. Assessing the Reasonableness of the El-Hage Search
Finally, Judge Sand addressed the reasonableness of the searches
in Bin Laden and summarily concluded that the warrantless physical
search of El-Hage’s home as well as the wiretaps, which were
operated continuously for a year, were reasonable. Judge Sand
determined the search of El-Hage’s home was reasonable in its scope
because it was performed during the daytime, the American official
present identified himself in true name to El-Hage’s wife, and the
only items searched were those believed to have foreign intelligence
value.60 The long-term, continuous electronic surveillance was
reasonable because of the covert and diffuse nature of terrorist
groups, the fact that the conversations were in a foreign language,
which made it likely that some could be in code, and the fact that
known Al-Qaeda members regularly used El-Hage’s phones.61 Judge
Sand also rejected El-Hage’s assertion that warrantless residential
searches were only permissible “in cases of exigency,” instead
allowing them “where a special need of the government is shown.”62
III. CHALLENGING THE APPLICATION OF THE
WARRANT REQUIREMENT TO OVERSEAS SEARCHES
Judge Sand was likely correct when he applied the Fourth
Amendment to American citizens abroad, but he proceeded under
the assumption that an exception to the warrant requirement would
be needed in order for evidence against El-Hage to be admissible.63
As a result, twenty-four pages of his opinion are spent expounding a

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).
Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 284.
Id. at 285.
Id. at 286.
Id. at 285.
Id. at 270–71.

06__THEN.DOC

2006]

10/4/2006 1:10 PM

WARRANT CLAUSE

1071

foreign intelligence exception, defending surveillance without a
warrant, and twisting the exclusionary rule to admit “unlawful”
evidence into the trial. Fewer than three pages at the end of the
opinion concern the reasonableness of the searches.
This Note suggests that instead of assuming a warrant
requirement exists and then looking for an exception, future courts
should re-examine the meaning of the Warrant Clause and conclude
that a warrant is not required to search American citizens abroad. As
an alternative to requiring warrants, more weight should be given to
the Reasonableness Clause. As a result, Fourth Amendment
violations should be remedied not with the impractical exclusion of
critical evidence, but with damages against those government actors
who conduct unreasonable searches and seizures. Section A of this
Part addresses the constitutional underpinnings and precedent
regarding warrants before Part B turns to the practical consequences
of administering them overseas.
A. Neither Precedent nor the Constitution Require a Warrant to
Conduct Searches Overseas
Yale Professor Akhil Reed Amar has argued persuasively that
the Fourth Amendment does not require any warrants at all, but
limits them so that whatever warrants are issued must have probable
64
cause and particularity. The amendment’s text and historical
antecedents support this position. “The Framers did not exalt
warrants, for a warrant was issued ex parte by a government official
on the imperial payroll and had the purpose and effect of precluding
any common law trespass suit . . . after the search or seizure
occurred.”65 In the United States’ early years, citizen targets could
bring trespass suits and receive jury trials when officials unlawfully
66
searched or seized their person or property. In response, federal
officials sought broad warrants because they provided absolute
immunity from lawsuits. “Warrants then, were friends of the searcher,
not the searched.”67 As a result, revolutionary Americans were
skeptical of warrants, numerous early judges were aware of their
immunizing potential, and even some modern Justices have

64.
65.
66.
67.

Amar, supra note 6, at 762, 771.
Id. at 771–72.
Id. at 774.
Id.
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recognized their history of aggrandizing governmental power rather
68
than protecting the citizen:
Far from restricting the constable’s arrest power, the institution of
the warrant was used to expand that authority by giving the
constable delegated powers of a superior officer such as a justice of
the peace. Hence at the time of the Bill of Rights, the warrant
functioned as a powerful tool of law enforcement rather than as a
69
protection for the rights of criminal suspects.

In addition, the so-called warrant requirement is clearly a
misnomer in that it is not absolute70 and there is a laundry list of
searches and seizures that either historically or currently do not
71
require a warrant, including arrests in public places, searches
72
73
pursuant to arrests, exigent circumstances, consent searches,74 plain
75
76
view searches, automobile searches, searches of vessels on the high
seas,77 and foreign intelligence searches.78 Americans are also
regularly subjected to constitutional warrantless searches in their
79
everyday lives, whether they are in public schools, crossing national
80
81
borders, or on airlines —searches which have become particularly
intrusive in the aftermath of 9/11.

68. Id. at 774, 778. For a more detailed and illuminating account of the historical
underpinnings of the per se unreasonableness of broad warrants, see id. at 771–81.
69. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 607–08 (1980) (White, J., dissenting, joined by
Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.).
70. Even Professor Dripps admits that “the warrant requirement is now pretty clearly
confined to private premises,” though he cautions against its abandonment. Dripps, supra note
7, at 1608.
71. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 421–23 (1976).
72. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 223–24 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 762–63 (1969).
73. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989); Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 298–300 (1967).
74. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,
169–71 (1974).
75. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326–27 (1987).
76. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977).
77. United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 494 (9th Cir. 1987).
78. United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir.
1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973).
79. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337–43 (1985).
80. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 564–66 (1976).
81. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n.3 (1989).
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Thus, even if one does not accept Amar’s theory in its entirety,
the Fourth Amendment’s history and text, as well as Supreme Court
precedent itself, demonstrate that the current Warrant Clause
jurisprudence is largely adjudicated on a fact-specific, case-by-case
basis and hinges primarily on practical and policy considerations.
Because neither the text nor the history of the Fourth Amendment
suggest that warrants should be required for all searches, there is no
reason that future courts must interpret the Fourth Amendment to
require warrants overseas.82 Undoubtedly, some people will resist this
proposition, especially when they consider its scope: refusing to
require warrants overseas would apply equally to surveillance
activities aimed at collecting foreign intelligence as well as to
collecting traditional criminal information. Yet before this idea is
tossed away as a heavy-handed apology for unlimited intrusions upon
privacy by Big Brother, one should understand that, unlike in the
domestic context, U.S. judicial warrants are not routinely used for
surveillance overseas; instead, American authorities normally rely on
the pre-search protections of the host nation. In fact, there is no
statutory authority for courts to issue such extraterritorial warrants,
and prior to Bin Laden, no criminal case had considered whether a
warrant was required for overseas searches.83
B. Requiring Warrants Overseas is Bad Policy and
Administratively Impractical
Requiring a warrant to search or seize Americans overseas raises
numerous practical and policy problems that may actually decrease
the security of Americans abroad and within the United States. The
most glaring administrative problem is that Rule 41 of the Federal

82. Recall Justice Harlan’s eloquent explanation that not all clauses of the Constitution
apply equally in an overseas context. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); see also Irvin B. Nathan & Christopher D. Man, Coordinated Criminal
Investigations Between the United States and Foreign Governments and Their Implications for
American Constitutional Rights, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 821, 822 (2002) (“[W]hile some constitutional
restrictions apply in the same manner whether the United States acts abroad or domestically,
other constitutional provisions are modified or rendered inapplicable when the United States
acts abroad.”).
83. Prior to the enactment of FISA, a federal district court did rule in a civil suit for
damages that a warrant was required to wiretap Americans living in West Germany and that the
plaintiffs had causes of action under the First and Sixth Amendments. Berlin Democratic Club
v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 158–60 (D.D.C. 1976). That court, however, was not faced with
the warrant requirement’s onerous consequence of having to decide whether to exclude
evidence of severe criminality.
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Rules of Criminal Procedure limits the jurisdiction of a federal
84
magistrate to the issuance of domestic warrants. The Supreme Court
considered but chose not to adopt a proposed amendment to Rule
41(a) that would have allowed for the issuance of “warrants to search
property outside the United States.”85 Thus, the Supreme Court’s
previous statement that any warrant from an American magistrate
86
“would be a dead letter outside the United States” still holds true.
This statement might be regarded as a direct refutation of any
warrant requirement reaching overseas. Yet at the very least, it
exposes an internal inconsistency in Judge Sand’s opinion due to his
reliance on a domestic Fourth Amendment framework: on one hand
he relies heavily on the absence of an administrative warrant
procedure to justify an exception, but on the other he implies that a
warrant might be required if the surveillance was for a normal
criminal investigation instead of foreign intelligence.87 Yet if a warrant
would be a “dead letter,” it would undoubtedly be so in either
context.
Congress could possibly rectify the current absence of a statutory
basis by requiring a preclearance procedure in the United States for
overseas searches and seizures; even if that procedure would be a
“dead letter” in foreign nations, it might serve as a check on our
government’s criminal and intelligence agents. Yet the fact that
84. FED R. CRIM. P. 41(b) (1994): Authority to Issue a Warrant. At the request of a federal
law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government:
(1) a magistrate judge with authority in the district—or if none is reasonably
available, a judge of a state court of record in the district—has authority to issue a
warrant to search for and seize a person or property located within the district;
(2) a magistrate judge with authority in the district has authority to issue a warrant for
a person or property outside the district if the person or property is located within the
district when the warrant is issued but might move or be moved outside the district
before the warrant is executed; and
(3) a magistrate judge—in an investigation of domestic terrorism or international
terrorism (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2331)—having authority in any district in which
activities related to the terrorism may have occurred, may issue a warrant for a
person or property within or outside that district.
85. FED R. CRIM. P. 41(a) cmt. (1994). Interestingly, in United States v. Moussaoui, 365
F.3d 292, 301 (4th Cir. 2004), the Fourth Circuit indicated that judges do have authority to
compel the testimony of witnesses who are abroad, but absolutely no mention was made of
warrants. In the absence of statutory authority, a common law theory granting jurisdiction may
be inconsistent with Rule 41(a)’s limitations on jurisdiction.
86. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274 (1990).
87. See United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 276–77 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting
the government’s assertion that it would be impossible to secure a warrant for overseas searches
and discussing the possibility of courts issuing a warrant without statutory authority based on
their common law powers).
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Congress has never bothered to enact such legislation, and has
explicitly rejected extending FISA-like procedures to overseas
88
intelligence gathering, counsels against now finding a constitutional
requirement of warrants overseas. Even if Congress were to change
its course and extend FISA-like protections overseas, it is only logical
to assume, as Judge Sand did in Bin Laden, that Americans abroad
would not be given greater protection than Americans within the
United States who fall under FISC jurisdiction. A constitutional
requirement of warrants overseas, however, would do just that for
foreign intelligence targets, because four circuits have already
determined that a warrant is not required for Americans within the
country.89 And FISC’s “rubberstamp”90 approval of Justice
Department requests for secret warrants—1,128 granted out of 1,128
requests in 2002,91 11,883 warrants with zero denials between 1978 and
1999,92 and only two substantive modifications out of over 13,000
approved warrants in the court’s first twenty-two years of
93
operation —is evidence that the procedural protections of a warrant
(or something like it) might not be that great, at least for foreign
94
intelligence targets.
88. “[L]egislation [governing foreign intelligence surveillance abroad] should be
considered separately because the issues are different than those posed by electronic
surveillance within the United States.” S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 7 n.2 (1978), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3970, 3976 (“[C]ertain problems and unique characteristics preclude the simple
extension of [FISA] to overseas surveillances.”); H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, at 27–28 (1978).
89. See supra note 38.
90. Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Liberties: Applying a Foreign Intelligence Model to
Domestic Law Enforcement, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1619, 1627 (2004).
91. Tanya Weinberg, PATRIOT Act Initiatives Disturb Civil Libertarians, FORT
LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, May 11, 2003, at B1.
92. Lawrence D. Sloan, Note, ECHELON and the Legal Restraints on Signals Intelligence:
A Need for Reevaluation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1467, 1496 (2001); see also Electronic Privacy
Information Center, FISA Orders 1979–2004, http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/
fisa_stats.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2006) (presenting similar statistics).
93. Stewart M. Powell, Secret Court Modified Wiretap Requests, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Dec. 24, 2005, at A9, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/
253334_nsaspying24.html.
94. In 2005 it was revealed that the Bush administration authorized National Security
Agency (NSA) surveillance of myriad overseas communications by terror suspects located
within the U.S. without requesting warrants from FISC. Eric Lichtblau, Bush Defends Spy
Program and Denies Misleading Public, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2006, at A11. Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales claimed that President Bush approved the program because the FISA court’s
approval process was too cumbersome but defended the program’s legality. Powell, supra note
93, at A9. One report indicates that in 2003 and 2004, FISC ordered “substantive modifications”
to 173 surveillance requests, when only two had been modified in the court’s first twenty-two
years. Id. It also rejected six requests for warrants—the first outright rejections in FISC’s
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In addition to these considerable practical difficulties, instituting
a warrant requirement for overseas searches could be seriously
detrimental to national security. Judge Sand detailed some of these
dangers in formulating the foreign intelligence exception in Bin
Laden: requiring law enforcement and intelligence agents located
overseas to communicate with judicial authorities back in the United
States or foreign judicial authorities would decrease the speed of the
executive response,95 increase the risk of security breaches, and could
undermine cooperative relationships with other nations.96 Needless to
say, the danger emanating from these possibilities is magnified
beyond ordinary proportions when dealing with terrorists rather than
ordinary domestic criminals.
Furthermore, in an intelligence context, the incentives created by
careerism, loyalty to one’s own agency, and a rational fear that
important information will be leaked already result in a tendency to
hoard rather than share information amongst the nation’s fifteen
separate intelligence agencies.97 The fact that intelligence agencies are
reluctant to share amongst themselves foreshadows the considerable
difficulty of forcing them to share with judges. Further, being
required to share sensitive information with a magistrate judge in
order to obtain a warrant may cause agencies to forego searches that
should be conducted. For instance, FBI headquarters refused to
follow the advice of one of its field offices to search the laptop of
Zacarias Moussaoui because it thought its request for a warrant
would be rejected.98

history—prompting the Bush administration to unilaterally bypass FISA. Id. While this
indicates that the existence of FISC may have prevented previous administrations from pursuing
surveillance programs blatantly outside of FISA’s provisions, it should also be remembered that
Congress explicitly disavowed instituting a system similar to FISA for surveillance taking place
overseas. In addition, the Clinton administration also maintained that it had authority to
conduct warrantless domestic searches for foreign intelligence purposes. Former Deputy
Attorney General Jamie Gorelick testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee on July
14, 1994 that “[t]he Department of Justice believes, and the case law supports, that the president
has inherent authority to conduct warrantless physical searches for foreign intelligence
purposes . . . and that the President may, as has been done, delegate this authority to the
Attorney General.” Byron York, Clinton Claimed Authority to Order No-Warrant Searches,
NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, Dec. 20, 2005, http://www.nationalreview.com/york/york
200512200946.asp.
95. United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 273–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
96. Id.
97. See generally POSNER, supra note 26. Posner cautions that due to the lack of knowledge
available to the public about certain agencies, this number is a close estimate.
98. Id. at 30.
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Finally, by accepting a warrant requirement and then declaring
an exception to it, Judge Sand was forced to address the attendant
exclusionary rule and devise yet another exception. Exclusion of
evidence as a remedy to a Fourth Amendment violation has been
attacked on historical and practical grounds, including the fact that it
was unheard of in early America,99 that it does not enhance judicial
100
integrity and fairness, and that an illegal search is rarely a but-for
cause of the introduction of evidence.101 Seeking to deter the
government by rewarding a criminal defendant with the windfall of
excluding culpatory evidence treats him like “a private attorney
general. But the worst kind.”102 “He is self-selected and self-serving.
He is often unrepresentative of the larger class of law-abiding
citizens . . . . [H]e is often despised by the public, the class he
implicitly is supposed to represent. . . . He is . . . an awkward
champion of the Fourth Amendment.”103 While the exclusionary rule
104
does have its notable defenders in the domestic context, like the
warrant requirement, it is not absolute and is pockmarked with

99. See, e.g., United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 843–44 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822)
(No. 15,551). In this circuit opinion, future Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story remarked that
[T]he right of using evidence does not depend . . . upon the lawfulness or
unlawfulness of the mode, by which it is obtained. . . . [E]specially on trials for crimes,
evidence is often obtained . . . by force or by contrivances . . . . Yet I am not aware,
that such evidence has upon that account ever been dismissed for incompetency.
Id.
100. Professor Amar points out that courts in England and many other countries reject the
exclusionary rule, as do American courts in civil cases, yet they are not considered unfair or
lacking integrity. Amar, supra note 6, at 792; see also John Kaplan, The Limits of the
Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1031 (1974) (describing the rejection of the
exclusionary rule in other countries besides the United States).
101. Amar, supra note 6, at 794–95. Since magistrates are more lenient in granting warrants
than courts are in reviewing them, often a police force that would have been able to obtain a
warrant but failed to apply for one under the belief that the search would fit a judicial exception
will later lose the evidence to the exclusionary rule. When a magistrate would have insulated the
search from review by granting a warrant, a subsequent judicial application of the exclusionary
rule does not mean the illegality of the search was a but-for cause of the introduction of the
evidence.
102. Id. at 796.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Roger J. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J.
319, 321–22. In explaining his reluctant acceptance of the exclusionary rule, Traynor said:
[I]llegal searches and seizures [became] a routine procedure subject to no effective
deterrent . . . . It was one thing to condone an occasional constable’s blunder, to
accept his illegally obtained evidence so that the guilty would not go free. It was quite
another to condone a steady course of illegal police procedures that deliberately and
flagrantly violated the Constitution of the United States . . . .
Id. at 322.
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105
exceptions. Even if the exclusionary rule is considered the better of
imperfect options in the domestic context, its deficiencies are
significantly magnified when applied to terrorists like El-Hage due to
the enormous damage terrorists can inflict upon the nation.
Even though the evidence against El-Hage was not ultimately
excluded, the Bin Laden methodology—an approach that requires
judges to call evidence “unlawful” and then find a loophole to admit
it—might itself decrease security. Within military and intelligence
106
circles, the concept of “lawfare” has emerged. Nations and terrorist
groups hostile to the United States have realized that they can no
longer compete with American military might. Understanding the
respect for law in Western societies, they seek instead to gain tactical
advantages by altering worldwide perception of the legality of the
U.S. government’s actions.107 Though the concept of lawfare is
primarily thought of as a tool to disrupt tactical operations in full
scale wars, its logic also extends to intelligence gathering and joint
criminal investigations between the United States and foreign
countries. Just as “perceptions of illegalities can have real operational
effects”108 in war, they may also erode the willingness of foreign
countries to cooperate in surveillance activities and of United States
citizens to support them. Al-Qaeda and organized crime are keenly
aware of this potential.109 Thus, headlines like CNN’s the day after Bin
Laden was announced, which proclaimed, “Judge says illegal phone

105. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301–02 (1967) (holding the exigent circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement applicable to “mere evidence” found by police while
searching for the defendant); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966) (holding
admissible a conversation obtained through the defendant’s misplaced trust in an informant);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966) (holding that Fifth Amendment privilege does
not protect physical evidence); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 620 (1965) (refusing to give
Mapp retroactive effect; implicitly but conclusively rejecting a Fifth Amendment rationale for
the exclusionary rule).
106. See Brigadier General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF, Presentation at Duke University
School of Law: Beating Law Books Into Swords: An Airman’s Perspective on Law, Lawyers,
and the Rise of ‘Lawfare’ in Modern Conflicts (Apr. 7, 2005).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. For example, organized crime has attacked the ability of Colombian leaders to
cooperate in international efforts to reduce the trafficking of drugs by staining them with the
perception of participation in illegal activities. “In a country where kingpin rebels live by
intimidation and bribery, it would not be surprising to find peasants turning up in Colombian
courts to press false charges–anonymously–against the most capable military leaders. Indeed,
there is proof that is happening.” Mary Anastasia O’Grady, What About Colombia’s Terrorists?,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2001, at A17.
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110

taps can be used in bomb trial,” are self-imposed injuries that would
be avoided with a different judicial approach to the Fourth
Amendment.111
The Bin Laden methodology runs into yet another difficulty
when one recognizes that classifying an individual as an agent of a
foreign power is becoming exceedingly difficult.112 Terrorist groups
like Al-Qaeda have responded to the war on terror by morphing
themselves from centralized, hierarchical organizations to
decentralized, entrepreneurial, terrorist individuals.113 As a result,
intelligence officials may suspect an individual of terrorist activities
but never be able to show that he is an agent of a foreign power.
Under the Bin Laden methodology, warrantless surveillance of this
new breed of unaffiliated terrorists might not fit under the foreign
intelligence exception, so the entire surveillance effort would be
termed unlawful, and future courts would be faced with the same
awkward predicament of whether to exclude incriminating evidence
or fashion a convoluted exception.
Thus, the history, text, and precedent surrounding the Fourth
Amendment do not compel an overseas warrant requirement, and
numerous practical and policy difficulties make it impractical and
potentially dangerous to implement. Instead, the personal liberty that
the Fourth Amendment aims to protect can be better safeguarded
with a more stringent reasonableness standard that is enforced by a
damages remedy.

110. CNN.com, Judge Says Illegal Phone Taps Can Be Used in Bomb Trial, http://archives.
cnn.com/2000/US/12/19/embassy.bombings.ap/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
111. In no way does the author intimate that freedom of the press should be infringed to
prevent unsavory headlines. Rather, the argument is simply that Judge Sand’s characterization
of the evidence as unlawfully obtained is incorrect.
112. Heather MacDonald, John M. Olin Fellow, Manhattan Inst. for Policy Research,
Remarks at Duke University School of Law, Center for Law, Ethics, and National Security, and
the Program in Public Law: Strategies for the War on Terrorism: Taking Stock (Apr. 7, 2005).
113. See Jessica Stern, The Protean Enemy, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 2003, at 27, 34
(providing a compelling account of Al-Qaeda’s “Protean nature,” encouragement of leaderless
“virtual network[s]” and “lone-wolf terrorists,” and ability to avoid detection by gaming law
enforcement agencies); see also Jonathan Kay, Terror Goes Po-Mo, NAT’L POST (CANADA),
Sept. 27, 2003, available at http://memri.org/bin/media.cgi?ID=61603 (summarizing presentation
of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism at “Post-Modern Terrorism: Trends,
Scenarios and Future Threats” conference in Herzliya, Israel in September of 2003).
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IV. FORMULATING A NEW APPROACH
In order to overcome some of the difficulties in using the Bin
Laden methodology for searches of Americans abroad, this Part
offers suggestions for a new judicial application of the Fourth
Amendment overseas. The majority of the ideas come from the
existing debate in the domestic context, but their application to
overseas searches may be particularly helpful in addressing the
differing practical considerations as well as security and liberty
interests that must be balanced overseas. Section A discusses a
stronger reasonableness standard, and Section B contours a potential
damages remedy. These ideas are offered as a first start for
commentators and judges to build upon and improve in thinking
about a new approach to the Fourth Amendment overseas.
A. A Stronger Reasonableness Standard
The cursory review of the reasonableness of the searches in Bin
Laden is again worth noting, as it accounts for a mere two and-onehalf pages in a twenty-six-page opinion. Under current Fourth
Amendment doctrine, this is not surprising: “Because of the
[Supreme] Court’s preoccupation with warrants . . . the Justices have
spent surprisingly little time self-consciously reflecting on what,
exactly, makes for a substantively unreasonable search or seizure.”114
The full answer to what constitutes an unreasonable search or seizure
will depend upon future courts giving it greater weight and spending
more time grappling with the issue in relation to specific scenarios.
Nonetheless, this Part sets out certain elements of searches and
seizures of Americans abroad that are immediately identifiable as
important to a reasonableness analysis, and concludes with a
discussion of potential damages remedies.
First, future courts should consider the probability of obtaining
information from the proposed search (essentially probable cause),
but also multiply that probability by the amount and value (together
the “magnitude”) of that information, and then weigh the result
against the intrusiveness of a search or seizure to the individual. If the
intrusiveness is greater than the probability times the magnitude, then
the search would be per se unreasonable. While perfect quantification
of these factors is impossible, judges routinely weigh interests in

114.

Amar, supra note 6, at 796, 801.
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115
116
multiple legal contexts, from torts to securities regulation, and
even detractors of civil remedies agree that judges could adequately
weigh these factors.117 This need not be the only consideration under
reasonableness, but rather a first hurdle for government officials.
For example, in Bin Laden, intelligence officials had a very high
probability of obtaining incriminating evidence from electronic
surveillance because the officials had previously identified the phone
lines as being used by Al-Qaeda members. The magnitude of the
information that could be received was also high because of its
potential to help prevent terrorist attacks, thereby justifying the very
intrusive methods. In contrast, using uninterrupted electronic
surveillance for a year to investigate a low-level American drug
peddler would be unreasonable because the magnitude of the offense
would not justify such a severe intrusion on privacy.
Further, the intelligence agents in Bin Laden did eventually
request and receive attorney general approval, and such approval
may well emerge as a prerequisite under a reasonableness inquiry in
order to conduct the most intrusive searches, particularly residential
and electronic searches. Merely obtaining attorney general approval
would not show that the search is per se reasonable—the 2005
revelation that Attorney General Alberto Gonzales approved a
spying program to monitor citizens’ telephone calls without
consulting FISA cautions against such a conclusion. In fact, such
blatant disregard of a Congressional statute would likely make the
searches per se unreasonable. Yet requiring attorney general
approval for highly intrusive searches does at least force attorneys
within a presidential administration to debate the legality of the
searches and seizures they approve. For instance, former Attorney
General John Ashcroft reportedly refused to authorize the current
spying program even after Gonzales implored him to approve it while

115. See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 739–40 (2d Cir. 1932) (establishing that failure to
take appropriate prophylactic measures when they would cost less than the probability of an
accident multiplied by its potential consequences results in liability for negligence).
116. See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that, in
insider trading cases, whether a fact is material depends upon the probability of the event’s
occurrence multiplied by its anticipated magnitude).
117. Dripps, supra note 7, at 1618 (“I have little doubt that it is technically feasible to create
effective civil remedies for Fourth Amendment violations.”); see also Berlin Democratic Club v.
Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 162 (D.D.C. 1976) (“Questions of causation and valuation of
damages are always thorny but never insuperable; courts traditionally have undertaken to
answer both.”).
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he was in the hospital with pancreatitis, and former Assistant
Attorney General James Comey resigned over the administration’s
118
decision to disregard FISA’s proscriptions. The attorney general
and the Department of Justice face enormous pressure from citizens
and the media to protect civil liberties, and in Congress’s explicit
declination to apply FISA overseas, such pressure may offer a
necessary check on the types of searches that are approved. Future
administrations may learn from the harsh public criticism of President
Bush’s abuses of power, including a rebuke from Republican Senator
John McCain and the opening of Judiciary Committee hearings by
Chairman and Republican Senator Arlen Specter,119 that conducting
unreasonable searches is bad policy.
In addition, some of the reasoning that is currently performed
under the Warrant Clause is more appropriate under the
Reasonableness Clause. For example, much controversy has
surrounded the Patriot Act’s amendment to FISA that gives FISC
jurisdiction over searches with a “significant” foreign intelligence
purpose rather than only searches with a sole or primary foreign
intelligence purpose.120 But this determination is exceedingly
arbitrary, because foreign intelligence collection will often lead to
criminal prosecutions, and it fails to consider the multiple roles that
the intelligence agencies play.121 Making a warrant requirement hinge
on a judicial determination of when a search’s purpose may have
switched from foreign intelligence collection to a normal criminal
investigation, as Bin Laden suggests is appropriate,122 places far too
much consequence on the selection of a cutoff date. The singular
importance of this determination would be dramatically lessened
under a reasonableness framework. Under such a framework, a
search that had the primary purpose of collecting foreign intelligence
would justify more intrusiveness than a search that only had a
118. See Daniel Klaidman et al., Palace Revolt, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 3, 2006, at 34 (describing
the vigorous debate amongst high-level White House attorneys over what types of surveillance
fall within the president’s powers).
119. Adam Nagourney, Seeking Edge in Spy Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2006, at A1.
120. Compare Chemerinsky, supra note 90, at 1627 (“The broad definition of terrorism and
the government’s power to use FISA for law enforcement is especially troubling because the
Patriot Act gives the government significant new powers to gather information.”) with In re
Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (“We, therefore, believe firmly, applying
the balancing test drawn from Keith, that FISA as amended is constitutional because the
surveillances it authorizes are reasonable.”).
121. United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
122. Id. (citing United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 916 (4th Cir. 1980)).
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significant foreign intelligence purpose, but it would be only one
factor in a much broader reasonableness inquiry. Moreover, whereas
Bin Laden counted the special factors attendant to cooperating with
foreign governments as a significant cost to requiring a warrant, these
factors could instead be considered in judging whether the execution
of a particular search was reasonable.
Indeed, at least one commentator has recommended replacing
per se rules of domestic Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with a
transnational approach to reasonableness.123 Under this approach,
either “international human rights norms and the search-and-seizure
practices of the world’s major legal systems,” or the practices and
124
expectations of the host country could be considered. In his
Verdugo-Urquidez concurrence, Justice Kennedy hinted at the latter
when he said that “the differing and perhaps unascertainable
conceptions of reasonableness and privacy that prevail abroad” were
reasons not to require a warrant.125 This line of thought echoes an
opinion Justice Kennedy wrote as a circuit judge that made
reasonableness the primary inquiry in determining the legality of
warrantless foreign searches and in which he refused to exclude
criminal evidence of drug smuggling obtained from warrantless
wiretaps.126
Finally, the values implicated by other protections in the Bill of
127
Rights could be incorporated into the Fourth Amendment analysis.
“A government policy that comes close to the limit set by one of
these independent clauses [in the Bill of Rights] can, if conjoined with
a
search
or
seizure,
cross
over
into
constitutional
128
unreasonableness.” For example, searching an American news
publication’s overseas office could trigger heightened Fourth
Amendment safeguards and higher standards of justification prior to
searching because of the obvious First Amendment values at stake.129
FISA partially recognized this idea by making it clear that an
American citizen cannot be considered an agent of a foreign power
123. Eric Bentley, Jr., Toward an International Fourth Amendment: Rethinking Searches and
Seizures Abroad After Verdugo-Urquidez, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 329, 371 (1994).
124. Id.
125. 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
126. United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 491–93 (9th Cir. 1987).
127. Amar, supra note 6, at 805.
128. Id.
129. See id. (discussing the “special dangers posed by the government’s searching and
seizing documents from the press”).
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“solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First
130
Amendment.” In addition to the First Amendment, searches of
attorneys’ offices might trigger heightened Fourth Amendment
requirements due to Sixth Amendment attorney-client privilege
concerns, and searches disproportionately focused on certain racial
groups could implicate the Equal Protection Clause and require more
131
stringent standards for searches. If judges become willing to place
greater emphasis on reasonableness, the list of factual scenarios that
implicate other values in the Bill of Rights would undoubtedly
expand and lead to protections from governmental interference
without the unique defects that warrants have in the international
context.
To illustrate how this idea might operate, consider the facts of
Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld.132 The United States Army
subjected Americans living in Berlin during the Cold War (including
attorneys, ministers, and journalists) to extensive electronic
surveillance because their activities, which included supporting
Senator McGovern for president in 1972 and the impeachment of
President Nixon, were considered potentially disruptive to Coalition
morale.133 The court ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs had
alleged cognizable First and Sixth Amendment violations, but
premised these violations on the fact that surveillance was conducted
without a warrant.134 Instead of dealing with the tenuous warrant
inquiry, the court could have easily dismissed the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment on Fourth Amendment reasonableness
grounds. Because First and Sixth Amendment rights were strongly
implicated, as well as the fact that the plaintiffs were not suspected of
being agents of a foreign power or even of serious criminal activities,
any use of wiretaps would have been considered a clear abuse of
government power under a reasonableness standard. In addition to
recognizing private causes of action under the First and Sixth
Amendments, the court could also have awarded damages for

130. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (2000).
131. Amar, supra note 6, at 806.
132. 410 F. Supp. 144, 158 (D.D.C. 1976).
133. Id. at 147.
134. Id. at 161 (“Taken together with the allegations of illegal electronic surveillance, the
complaint sets forth a concerted military effort to discredit certain groups of individuals for
allegedly innocent activities.”).
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unreasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, which leads to the
final point.
B. The Damages Remedy
Americans can currently sue federal officials for Fourth
Amendment violations, yet they cannot sue the federal government
itself. The reasonableness doctrine is decidedly underdeveloped, and
135
warrants often immunize federal officials from liability. Expanding
the reasonableness doctrine to recognize more instances where a suit
for damages is appropriate and removing the immunizing potential of
warrants would offer Americans abroad greater protection from their
government, as would permitting suits directly against the federal
government, though that debate is not taken up here. Still, an
expanded reasonableness regime raises new questions. For instance,
in cases like Berlin Democratic Club, where the individuals were not
suspected of any crime, suits for damages clearly offer greater privacy
protection because there is no expectation of a criminal trial where
the exclusionary rule may be applied. But in a case where the
surveilled individual is clearly guilty of a crime, will courts ever be
able to find the search that produced the incriminating evidence
unreasonable and then award damages? The answer is “yes” for two
reasons. First, judges make even more awkward judgments all the
time by excluding incriminating evidence rather than compensating
for it. Second, as judges confront new cases through this lens, certain
actions will be recognized as unreasonable as a matter of law. Law
enforcement and intelligence agencies operating abroad will be
deterred from searching one’s home or applying electronic
surveillance, unless there is a very high likelihood of criminal activity
or of obtaining very valuable information due to the seriousness of
the issue being investigated, lest they be slapped with a hefty damages
judgment.
Damage judgments also raise indemnity questions, such as
whether it is fair for taxpayers to pay for abuses of power by law
135. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
397 (1971) the Supreme Court recognized a private right of action under the Fourth
Amendment against federal officials who violate the Amendment. While the federal
government itself has sovereign immunity, many commentators have urged its abolition. Erwin
Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1211 (2001); Kenneth Culp
Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending to Sue an Officer, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 435,
438–39 (1962). The approach to the Fourth Amendment offered here provides yet another
justification for allowing suits directly against the government.
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enforcement. Yet the public already pays dearly for such abuses in
the currency of lost convictions rather than in dollars and cents.
From an operational perspective, in most cases the plaintiff
should have the option to be tried by a jury, which “is perfectly placed
to decide, in any given situation, whom it fears more, the cops or the
136
robbers.” In the context of national security cases, however, this
raises an additional complication. Should jury trials for damages be
allowed when sensitive foreign intelligence information could be
revealed? If the government is willing to release information in a
criminal trial before a jury, then the same information, with the same
cautionary procedures, should be used in a corresponding civil trial.
As for those cases where the government would not be willing to
release sensitive information in a criminal trial, or simply doesn’t
have enough evidence to prosecute one, but is caught in what the
plaintiff alleges is an unreasonable search, a court could weigh the
competing interests in camera. Only if the information is absolutely
vital to the national interest could the court decide not to grant a jury
trial and evaluate the search’s reasonableness itself.
One might also ask what good a finding that a search was
unreasonable would do for a criminal defendant who is convicted on
evidence so obtained. Yet that is the very point of abandoning the
exclusionary rule in an overseas context,137 because the rapist, the
murderer, or the international terrorist should not be turned loose.
“Thus, the courts best affirm their integrity and fairness not by closing
their eyes to truthful evidence, but by opening their doors to any civil
suit brought against wayward government officials, even one brought
by a convict.”138 The victim of an unreasonable search, even if a
criminal, should receive damages that compensate in accordance with
the actual injury suffered, rather than receive the windfall of excluded
evidence. And to effectively deter the government, punitive damages
might sometimes be an appropriate reward, especially when one
acknowledges that some unreasonable searches will never come to

136. Amar, supra note 6, at 818.
137. This is not to say that no evidence should ever be excluded; abandoning the
exclusionary rule simply means that exclusion is not a requirement, but may be used as just
another tool in a reasonableness inquiry. In the case of a very intrusive search that reveals only
minor criminal violations, a judge might consider the search so unreasonable that in addition to
monetary damages, the evidence should be excluded. Maintaining “the suppression remedy as a
shotgun in the closet” for the most unreasonable searches might well prevent reckless violations
of Fourth Amendment standards. Dripps, supra note 7, at 1623.
138. Amar, supra note 6, at 793 (emphasis added).
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light. Unlike exclusion, however, punitive damages are a flexible
remedy. When the victim has done no wrong, society may choose to
award the punitives directly to the victim, but when the victim is a
criminal, the punitives could be diverted into some sort of socially
139
beneficial fund.
One final objection might be that if they have the right to a jury
trial, many defendants will file separate civil suits alleging
unreasonableness after their criminal trial, even when they lose. Yet
judges could still screen these claims at the summary judgment stage
140
to see if they could succeed as a matter of law. Or the criminal jury
might be asked, in addition to their finding of guilt or innocence, to
determine whether a search or seizure was unreasonable, a threshold
that the defendant would have to overcome in order to later file a
civil claim.
CONCLUSION
In an era of globalization and the war on terror, Bin Laden is
merely a precursor to future cases that will force courts to consider
the propriety of government searches of Americans abroad. Rather
than flail through the incoherent domestic doctrine, future courts
would be wise not to recognize a warrant requirement in the overseas
context. Such a move would be supported by the Fourth
Amendment’s history and text as well as by the government’s current
practices, and would obviate a need for any foreign intelligence
exception. Articulating a more stringent reasonableness standard is
possible without a great deal of judicial innovation due to the lack of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the overseas context, and would
avoid the logistical problems and dangers to security associated with
requiring warrants abroad. Finally, readily awarding damages to
victims of unreasonable searches would better deter government
officials than the current exclusionary rule and, thus, make the

139. Professor Amar suggests a fund to educate Americans about the Fourth Amendment
and comfort victims of crime and police brutality. Id. at 815. If the exclusionary rule were only
abandoned in the overseas context, perhaps these damages could be used to compensate victims
of international crime and terrorism and to promote tolerance between people of all nations.
140. Again, this Note only addresses searches and seizures of Americans abroad. If
reasonableness principles did come to dominate domestic Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
the number of civil suits filed would likely be great. Perhaps the volume of cases might best be
handled by establishing panels to prescreen cases for a likelihood of success on the merits
before passing them to a judge, or by assigning prescreening to magistrates who, incidentally,
would be spending less time reviewing requests for warrants.

06__THEN.DOC

1088

10/4/2006 1:10 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:1059

American people for whose protection the Fourth Amendment was
141
written more “secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.”

141.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

